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The 1992 Housing and Community Development Act directed the two government-sponsored 
housing enterprises -- Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac -- to increase their lending in "underserved areas" and 
where there are "unmet housing needs."  Unfortunately, Congress did not specify how unmet mortgage 
needs were to be measured or how underserved areas were to be identified.  To shed light on this issue, we 
use data collected under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act to provide a baseline evaluation of the 
variation in mortgage credit flows from all lenders across different types of neighborhoods.  These data 
represent a virtual census of all mortgage loan applications in metropolitan areas for the years 1990 and 
1991. Variations in both loan application and lender denial rates are examined separately, recognizing that 
loan originations depend on both processes.  An attempt is made to isolate the effect of neighborhood 
characteristics by controlling for other factors, such as the borrower's income and race, market effects, and 
lender behavior. 
After other factors are controlled for, the study concludes that the racial composition of a 
neighborhood appears to have little impact on either the likelihood that a loan application will be denied or 
the rate at which applications are made.  On the other hand, the race of the applicant appears to have a 
strong impact on loan denial.  Black applicants, in particular, have unexplainably high denial rates.  The 
income of a neighborhood does appear to impact both denial and application rates, with neighborhoods 
below a median income of $20,000 being particularly disadvantaged. Finally, once other factors are 
controlled for, the fact that a neighborhood is in a central city appears to have little impact on credit flows. 
The study cautions that although these data represent the most comprehensive information available, 
questions remain about both the coverage of the dataset and the impact of many omitted variables, such as 
applicant credit history and property valuation. 
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When Congress enacted the Housing and Community Development Act (HCDA) in 1992, it added 
another legislative initiative to a 25-year federal tradition of support for the goal of equal access to credit 
markets for all segments of the community. The Act directed the two government-sponsored housing 
enterprises (GSEs) -- Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac -- to increase their lending in "underserved areas" and 
where there are "unmet housing needs."  In the short run, interim targets specify that 30 percent of the 
GSEs' purchased mortgages must be in central cities, rural areas, or other underserved locations, and 30 
percent must be  made to borrowers with incomes below their area's median.  By 1995, the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) is to replace these targets with permanent ones. 
The language and spirit of HCDA are very similar to those of the 1977 Community Reinvestment 
Act (CRA), which requires depository institutions (mainly commercial banks and savings and loans) to 
i 
help meet the credit needs of their entire community, including low- and moderate-income neighborhoods, 
in a manner consistent with safe and sound banking.  Initial enforcement of CRA by the federal banking 
regulatory agencies focused on procedures used to advertise and solicit loan applications (phcularly 
mortgages) from low-income and minority (nonwhite) neighborhoods.  Increasingly, however, community 
groups have pressured regulators to shift enforcement toward quantitative standat&.'  This has raised the 
same issue about how unrnet mortgage needs are measured as HUD will face in devising permanent GSE 
targets under HCDA.  Unfortunately, there is little agreement about how to identify underserved areas. 
The underlying premise of both HCDA and CRA is that some sort of market breakdown exists under which 
well-qualified borrowers are willing to pay prevailing mortgage rates but are unable to secure a mortgage. 
This might occur because of either supply constraints (lenders may discriminate against certain individuals 
or neighborhoods, or they may incorrectly perceive the risk of such lending) or demand considerations 
(borrowers might have incorrect perceptions about underwriting standards).  Although the premise may be 
See Neuberger and Schmidt (1994) md Avery (1989). 
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vary across individuals or neighborhoods for many reasons other than the presence or absence of a market 
breakdown.  Supply may vary because lending risk differs, and demand may vary for a host of reasons. 
The objective of this paper is to provide a baseline evaluation of the variation in mortgage credit 
flows across different types of neighborhoods.  We focus on mortgage credit because of its heavily 
geographic component and its specific citation in HCDA.  In our analysis, we examine variation in loan 
application and lender denial rates separately, recognizing that the variable of concern -- loan originations 
-- depends on both processes.  The spirit of our inquiry is descriptive; we do not pretend to answer 
definitively the question of how to identify an underserved area Hopefully, a better understanding of the 
reduced-form stylized facts can provide signs about where future research can best be directed. 
We use data recently made available under the 1989 amendments to the Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act (HMDA).  Starling in 1990, the amendments required covered lenders operating in 
metropolitan areas (MSAs) to report on a census tract basis, among other things, detailed information on 
individual mortgage loan applicants, including income and race and disposition of the applications. 
Curiously, despite congressional interest in credit flows to specific types of neighborhoods, most analysts 
have used post-1989 HMDA data to investigate charges of racial discrimination against individual loan 
applicants. The role of property location remains largely unexplored with this dataset2 
Canner (1981), Avery and Buynak (1981), Avery and Canner (1983), and Bradbury, Case, and Dunham (1989) 
contrast the differences in mortgage credit originations between predominantly white and predominantly minority 
neighborhoods in various MSAs.  These studies use either pre-1990 HMDA data or lien title data to infer from the 
neighborhoods' characteristics whether mortgage lenders treat neighborhoods differently depending on their racial 
composition. In studies combining individual and neighborhood data, King (1980) and Schafer and Ladd (1981) 
find little evidence of  neighborhood effects, but they do uncover some evidence of higher denial rates for black and 
Hispanic applicants. While quite informative, these studies are limited in their geographic coverage and in the 
number and types of  lenders surveyed. More recently, Munnell et al. (1992) conducted a special survey of home 
purchase applications in Boston matched to the 1990 HMDA frame.  They determined that once an individual's 
race is factored in, neighborhood racial composition accounts for little.  However, their sample contained a 
relatively small number of  minority neighborhoods.  Similarly, Megbolugbe and Cho (1993) and Buist, 
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census tracts and used to construct application rates by tract, scaled by the number of tract housing units as 
measured in the 1990 Decennial Census.  Application denial rates are also constructed by aggregating 
actions on individual loan applications into tract averages.  Our analysis focuses on how these two 
variables differ across different types of neighborhoods -- specifically, neighborhoods sorted by median 
family income and percent minority population. We examine the gross variation in these two measures as 
well as the variation controlling for 1) individual characteristics of the borrower and loan and 2) 
demographic characteristics of the tract. 
Although HMDA data are by far the most comprehensive available on the geographic distribution 
of mortgages, they raise several concerns. First, many applicant-level variables used in lenders' credit 
decisions are not collected. These include the applicant's credit history, work history, debt burdens, and 
wealth, for example.  Second, no information is provided about the physical condition of the individual 
property securing the mortgage being sought.  To the extent that these individual and property 
characteristics are correlated with neighborhood characteristics,  this creates problems in identifying a pure 
neighborhood effect. 
Finally, concern has been expressed about the completeness of HMDA coverage.  Evidence 
suggests that some lenders, particularly mortgage bankers, may not be filing HMDA reports.  If such 
omissions are not random, then this presents a potentially serious drawback to the use of our application 
rate variable. This is particularly troublesome because we have argued elsewhere (see Avery, Beeson, and 
Megbolugbe, and Trent (1994) use post-1989 HMDA data to examine geographic variations in mortgage lending, 
but they restrict themselves to MSA-level aggregates. 
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that across lenders, and thus potentially across neighborhoods, application rate variation explains a much 
larger percentage of the variation in origination rates than do denial rates.  Because of its importance to the 
debate over underserved neighborhoods and the lack of a better data source, we present evidence on the 
distribution of application rates constructed from HMDA data.  However, these results should be viewed 
with caution until we have a better understanding of the potential bias stemming from undercoverage. 
By  way of preview, we find that once other factors are controlled for, the racial composition of a 
census tract has little impact on either its application rate or the likelihood that a loan will be denied  On 
the other hand, tract income appears to be important. Ceteris paribus, low-income tracts, particularly those 
with median incomes below $20,000,  show significantly lower application rates and higher denial rates 
than other areas.  Although the racial composition of a tract doesn't appear to matter, we do find that the 
race of an individual has a large impact on denial rates.  Black applicants, in particular, have unexplainably 
high denial rates.  Finally, although the interim HCDA guidelines set specific targets for central city 
lending, we find little evidence that central city tracts have either lower application rates or higher denial 
rates once other tract characteristics are accounted for. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the framework for 
the empirical analysis used to identify neighborhood effects.  In section III, we discuss the dataset used in 
the study, describe the steps used to prepare it, and give simple descriptive statistics. Section IV presents 
the bulk of the analysis and a discussion of the results.  Conclusions are reported in section V. 
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The purpose of this paper is to examine variation in mortgage lending patterns -- both application 
rates and denial rates -- across neighborhoods (i.e., census tracts).  Ideally, we would like to isolate true 
neighborhood differences; that is, differences that stem from characteristics of the neighborhood itself 
rather than from characteristics of either the individuals who apply for loans in the neighborhood or the 
lenders that happen to serve them. Unfortunately, since we lack any information on persons who did not 
apply for loans, analysis of application rates must be conducted at the neighborhood level without controls 
for any individual or lender characteristics. Infomation in HMDA filings, however, does allow the 
potential to control for some borrower and lender characteristics in the analysis of denial rates. This is 
done through a two-stage procedure.  In the first stage, we use the complete 1990/1991 HMDA filings to 
identify neighbodmod differences in denial rates that cannot be explained by characteristics of the 
application or lender.3 These neighbofhood residuals are then used as dependent variables in second-stage 
regressions relating them to neighborhood characteristics drawn from the 1980 and 1990 Decennial 
Censuses. This approach parallels the one we used in two earlier studies designed to isolate individual and 
lender effects (Avery ,  Beeson, and Sniderman [1993a, 1993bl). 
In the first stage, we assume that each mortgage applicant's risk can be represented as a function of 
hisher race and economic characteristics (such as income), neighborhood (census tract), market (MSA), 
and lender.  We have no basis with which to select a particular econometric model specification.  However, 
the size of the dataset dictates that in practice we assume a linear-probability  model specification4 Thus, 
-- 
At the time this paper was written, 1992 HMDA data were also available.  However, the geographic taxonomy 
used for reporting loans changed from 1980 census tracts to 1990 tracts in 1992.  Thus, the analysis was restricted 
to 1990 and 1991 in order to utilize a consistent geographic framework. 
AS discussed later, a large number of nonlinear transformations and interactions of  the independent variables 
are used.  We do this to increase the robustness of  the results and to reduce the potential impact of the arbitrary 
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following terms: 
where DENIAL is one if the ith application using the Lth lender in the Mth MSA and Tth census tract is 
denied, and zero otherwise.  MSA, TRACT, and LENDER are dummy variables indicating which MSA, 
census tract, and lender the application relates to, and e is a residual.  AC is a vector of application 
characteristics, other than race, reported in the HMDA data It includes gender, marital status, occupancy, 
income, loan amount, income-to-loan ratio, federal loan guarantee (Federal Housing Administration [FHA] 
or Department of Veterans Affairs [VA]), and month of the year the application was acted upon.'n6  RACE 
is a set of dummy variables indicating the race of the applicant and co-applicant; each is interacted with 
FHA/VA status as well as income. The model is specified and estimated separately for each of three types 
selection of  the model form.  With more than 2,000,000 observations, the use of either a logistic or probit model 
form would have been impractical. 
'  To help minimize the possibility that the differences we identify within and across neighborhoods reflect 
nonlinearities in other effects that are correlated with location, we allow for a considerable degree of nonlinearity 
in the effects of individual characteristics. Income and loan amount are entered as linear spline functions with 
seven knots each (dummies are also used for small home improvement loans), and the income-to-loan-amount  ratio 
is entered as a series of six dummy variables. A  fiveknot linear spline for income is interacted with a dummy 
variable indicating the presence of a co-applicant, and with dummy variables indicating that the application is for 
an FHA or VA  loan.  Similarly, a five-knot linear spline of loan amount, and the six dummy variables indicating 
ranges of values for the ratio of income to loan amount, are also interacted with a dummy variable indicating 
applications for FHA or VA  loans. 
6 The month of the action date is included as a crude proxy for interest rates and other market conditions. 
Lenders reported the date of both the application and loan action. The application month would be the ideal choice 
as a proxy for interest rates, since most mortgage rates are locked in at that point.  Unfortunately, the filing year is 
defined by the action date, which is the date of  denial for a denied application, but the closing date for accepted and 
originated mortgages.  Because the closing date is typically a month or two later than the approval date, this 
creates a systematic bias in the HMDA  data in the relationship between the loan action and application dates and 
the loan's disposition. For example, more than  half of the applications made in November or December 1991 and 
filed for the 1991 calendar year were denials. Closing dates for accepted applications during those months were 
likely to extend over the first of the year and thus were filed for the 1992 calendar year.  Potentially, this problem 
could be reduced by combining several years of data.  However, this raises the issue of changing frling 
requirements. 
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sample years, 1990 and 199  1. 
To reduce the computing requirements, the actual estimation was done in two steps. In the first 
step, equation (1) was estimated with the individual application characteristics (AC) and separate intercepts 
for each 1enderJcensus  tract combination included as single-component fixed effects.  The MSA, lender, 
and tract effects are thus intertwined in these intercepts. In the second step, an iterative procedure, 
equivalent to regressing the fixed-effects intercepts against MSA, census tract, and lender dummies, was 
used to identify the MSA, tract, and lender effects.  Separate lender effects were estimated for each MSA, 
thus defining lenders operating in multiple MSAs as multiple lenders.  By construction, the MSA effects 
were normalized to have overall sample means of zero, and within each MSA, lender and tract means were 
normalized to zero.  In cases where lender and tract effects were not identified (a lender was the only lender 
in a tract and did dl of its business there), the effect was assigned to the tract. 
The parameter estimates from equation (I), together with the characteristics of the applications 
received (AC, RACE, and LENDER), are used to predict denial rates for each neighborhood. 
Neighborhood denial residuals are measured as the difference between the neighborhood's predicted and 
actual denial rates: 
(2)  DENIAL RESIDUfij  = DENIfij  - (PA~ACT~  + PRJRACET~  + PLAENDERT~), 
where DENIAL (the actual denial rate), AC, RACE, and LENDER are tract averages for the jth loan type 
(home purchase, refinance, home improvement) and Tth tract.  Note that these residuals reflect relative 
treatment, since, by construction, the average residual across all  neighborhoods is zero.  Also note that the 
residuals include MSA effects (which are normalized to zero).  Thus, the tract residuals reflect both within- 
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that it is the absolute characteristics of a tract, and its absolute denial rate, that matter.  This would be the 
case if  the United States were truly one national meet,  but may not be true if MSA market conditions are 
important. 
Although these residuals are constructed for each of the three types of loans and each-year, our 
analysis combines 1990 and 1991 data for each loan type using a weighted average.  A second set of 
residuals that factor out the MSA effects, J3MjMSA~j,  were also constructed. These residuals are deviations 
about MSA means, indicating that the relevant consideration for a tract is its relative position within an 
MS A. 
In the second stage of estimation, these neighborhood residuals are regressed on various 
neighborhood chkacteristics. The general form of the estimation is as follows: 
(3)  DENIAL RESIDUAkj = xCENSUST + UTj, 
where J indicates loan type, T specifies tract, and CENSUS is a vector of variables drawn from the 1980 
and 1990 Decennial Censuses. Regressions are run for the whole sample and separately for center city and 
suburban (non-central city) tracts.  We use both absolute tract residuals, including between-MSA effects, 
and relative residuals, specified as deviations about MSA means. 
Consistent with the qualifications cited earlier, we also examine the relationship between loan 
application rates and neighborhood characteristics. Applications are summed for each tract over the two 
years for each loan type and are  then deflated by the stock of  1-4 unit residential properties as defmed by 
the 1990 Decennial Census.  This variable is regressed against the same set of independent vaiiables as 
used for the denial rate regressions in equation (3): 
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with j, T, and CENSUS as defined above. 
111.  DATA 
Mortgage Loan Ap~lication  and Disposition Data 
Data on individual loan applications and dispositions for 1990 and 1991, used in the first-stage 
estimation for the denial rate and to form the numerator of the application rate, are collected under the 1989 
revisions to HMDA.  The amended HMDA data form one of the most comprehensive sets of statistics on 
mortgage lending available in the United States. Nearly all commercial banks, savings and loan 
associations, credit unions, and other mortgage lending institutions (primarily mortgage banks) with assets 
of more than $10 million and an office in an MSA are required to report on each mortgage loan purchased 
and loan application filed during the calendar year.  Lenders must report the loan amount, census tract of 
the property, whether the property is owner occupied, purpose of the loan (home purchase, home 
improvement, or refinancing), loan guarantee (conventional, FHA, or VA), loan disposition (loan approved 
and originated, application approved but withdrawn, no lender action taken [incomplete data or application 
withdrawn], or application denied), race and gender of the loan applicant (and co-applicant, if any), and 
income relied on by the lending institution in making the loan decision.'*' 
'  See Canner and Smith (1991,1992) for a comprehensive discussion of the HMDA data 
'  Instihltions with assets of  less than $30 million are not required to report race, income, or gender for loan 
applicants. In addition, the HMDA filings contain many errors and inconsistencies even after extensive editing by 
the receiving agencies.  We dealt with missing and implausible data by using a "hot deck" imputation procedure 
similar to that used by the U.S. Census Bureau.  Applications with missing or implausible data were statistically 
matched to applications for the same type of loan in the same census tract that came closest to them in reported 
characteristics (race, loan action, income, and loan amount).  Missing values were filled in using the variable value 
of the matched observation. Overall, income was imputed for 4.9 percent, loan amount for 1.5 percent, gender for 
4.0  percent, and race for 5.6 percent of the study sample applications. 
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9,365 institutions filed on 7,939,107 loans.  Our analysis focuses on the 7,938,438 loan applications in the 
two years for 1-4 unit residential properties that were acted upon (denied or accepted) by the  lender^.^  Of 
these, 4,072,158 were for home purchase loans, 2,216,810 were to refinance an existing mortgage loan, 
and 1,649,470  were for home improvement loans (generally second or third mortgages).1° These 
applications were received by 8,745 separate institutions operating in 40,008 census tracts in all 341 of the 
MSAs defined as of 1990. For our analysis, we define lender at the MSA level; thus, an institution 
reporting applications for two different MSAs is treated as two different lenders.  There are 23,248 such 
lenders in our sample. 
Descriptive statistics for the applications reported for 1990 and 1991  under HMDA are presented 
in table 1.  Statistics are given separately for home purchase, refinancing, and home improvement loan 
applications. Clearly, housing credit applicants are a select group of American families.  Applicants' 
median income ($49,000) is substantially higher than the median income of families in MSAs ($37,918) as 
The following loan filings were omitted from the sample: 1) loans purchased from other institutions (because 
they did not require an action by  the reporting lender and often were missing geographic information) and 
applications for properties outside the MSAs in which the lender had an office (5,670,768 loans dropped), 2) 
applications for multifamily homes (55,703 loans dropped), and 3) applications that never reached the stage of 
lender action because they were either withdrawn by the applicant or closed for incompleteness (869,287 loans 
dropped). Overall in 1990 (1991), the sample consisted of 1,984,688 (2,087,470) home purchase loan applications, 
7 16,595 (1,500,215) refmcing applications, and 787,952 (86 15  18) home improvement loan applications.  The 
fd  sample includes some mobile home loans and condominium loans, since they were treated as 1-4 family units 
in the HMDA reporting guidelines. 
lo The distinction between loan types may be blmed. Institutions were allowed to report home improvement 
loans secured by a fnst lien as either home purchase or home improvement loans.  Some home improvement loans 
may also be reported as refinancings if a new first lien was issued.  Some refinancing may not have been reported 
at all. If a refmcing was undertaken primarily for a purpose other than home purchase or home improvement 
(such as college expenses or to start a business), then it did not have to be reported.  Similarly, unless the borrower 
specifically noted home improvement as a reason for the loan, lenders did not have to report home equity or 
second-lien mortgages. 
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from that of all U.S. families. Blacks filed 7.4 percent of the HMDA housing loan applications for the 
three loan types, yet headed 11.4 percent of the MSA households and represented 7.7 percent of all 
homeowners in the 1990 Decennial Census.  Asian loan applicants (5.2 percent), however, were 
overrepresented compared with their numbers in  the census (2.5 percent of MSA household heads and 2.2 
percent of homeowners). The percentage of applicants who were white (8 1.9 percent) or Hispanic (7.5 
percent) is approximately representative of their numbers (78.1 percent of household heads and 84.8 
percent of homeowners for whites, and 7.5 percent of household heads and 5.0 percent of homeowners for 
Hispanics).12 It is also apparent that denial rates differ substantially by race for all three types of loans. 
Census Data 
Data used as explanatory variables in the second stage of the analysis were drawn from the 1980 
and 1990 Decennial Censuses.  Unfomately, although most tracts remained the same, some boundary 
definitions were changed between 19  80 and 1990. In filing 1990 and 199  1 HMDA reports, lenders were 
required to use 1980 census tract definitions. However, the most relevant census information, that for 
1990, is reported by the Census Bureau using 1990 tract definitions.  To resolve this problem, we decided 
to use 1980 tract definitions as the mode of analysis and to use estimates of  1990 census information.  Data 
were obtained from Claritas Corporation, which aggregated block-level 1990 census data to 1980-defined 
tract totals.  Change variables were calculated using 1980 census information and Claritas's 1990 
estimates. 
l1 In the HMDA data, household income may be slightly understated, as it reflects only the portion of  an 
applicant's income needed for mortgage qualification. 
l2 These figures exclude Puerto Rico, which is included in the table 1 statistics. If Puerto Rico is included, 
Hispanics are 8.1 percent of  the loan sample. 
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methodology just described. However, for a few outer areas of some MSAs that were not tracted in 1980, 
loan and census information had to be aggregated to the county level.  In a few other instances, tracts had 
to be dropped for a variety of reasons. We lacked census information on Puerto Rico and thus excluded it 
from the analysis.  We also dropped HMDA loans in tracts that had no residents, in those with insufficient 
numbers to provide racial breakdowns, and in those with less than 50 dwellings. In total, the sample for the 
second stage consisted of  38,697 of the original 40,008 HMDA census tracts, with 98.9 percent 
(7,851,680) of the original HMDA loan applications. Puerto Rico accounted for the majority of the 
omissions. 
Specific census variables selected for the analysis include the following: 1) percent minority 
population of each tract (defined here as all nonwhites -- Hispanic, black, Asian, native American, and 
other race), 2) median family income, 3) median owner-occupied house value, 4) age distribution of 
household heads, 5) distribution of residential dwellings by number of units in the structure, 6) percentage 
of  1-4 unit residential properties that were vacant and rented, and 7) variables indicating the distribution of 
the housing stock by vintage.  1990 values were used for each of these variables (except the housing age 
variables, which used 1980 data) as well as for the change from 1980 to 1990. 
The sample distribution of tracts, population, owner-occupied housing units, and total 1990/1991 
HMDA loan applications for the three loan classes is reported in table 2.  Information is given for the total 
population and for minorities. Distributions are shown for census tracts sorted by minority population 
share in 1990, change in minority population share from 1980 to 1990, share of black population, share of 
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value from 1980 to 1990,13  median family income in 1990, and center citylsuburban and MSA size. 
?he most interesting comparison in table 2 is between column 4 (the stock of  1-4 unit residential 
properties as measured by the Decennial Census) and columns 5,7, and 9 (loan applications for 
comparable units).  Interestingly, those tracts with less than 5 percent minority population are 
proportionately represented in loan applications, whereas 10 to 50 percent minority tracts have 
disproportionately more loan applicants, and more than 50 percent minority tracts have disproportionately 
fewer applicants. It appears that predominantly black tracts are particularly underrepresented. It also 
appears that tracts with median home values above $100,000 or median incomes above !$40,000 have a 
disproportionately large number of  applicants, but that areas with substantial increases in housing value 
from 1980 to 1990 have less than their share of applicants. 
Table 3 reports HMDA denial rates for white, black, and Hispanic applicants by tract using the 
same taxonomy as in table 2.  It appears that differences across racial groups dominate those across 
neighborhood types.  Interestingly, a neighborhood's racial composition seems to affect the treatment of 
white applicants much more than it does blacks or Hispanics.  Tract house value and income appear to 
impact each racial group in roughly proportional ways.  On the other hand, the change in housing value 
seems to be unrelated to lender treatment. Finally, denial rates are somewhat higher in central cities than in 
subudxv~  areas, but at least for blacks and Hispanics, MSA size appears to have an even larger effect. 
l3 Measured in nominal terms.  The Consumer Price Index rose about 50 percent over this period. 
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Parameter estimates for the first-stage regressions predicting the denial of an application are 
presented in tables 4,5, and 6.14915  In examining these numbers, a positive coefficient can be interpreted as 
the expected increase in the probability that an applicant's loan will, be denied resulting from a one-unit 
increase in the independent variable, holding all other variables constant (specifically, the applicant's MSA, 
census tract, and lender). Thus, the coefficients on race, for example, represent the expected difference in 
the probability that a white and black applicant with the same income, gender, FHA/VA status, loan 
amount, month of action date, MSA, census tract, and lender will have their loan applications denied. Thus 
interpreted, the estimated black/white (.I04 and .106) and Hispanic/white (.038 and .052) differences for 
conventional home purchase loans are quite sigmficant. Differences are similar for refinance and home 
improvement loans. This might appear to be tangential to our examination of neighbohood effects. 
However, since minorities tend to live in segregated communities, if they are underserved as individuals, 
then a policy of targeting minority neighborhoods may be warranted -- even if the neighborhood racial 
composition per se does not appear to be related to denial rates. 
The second stage of the analysis consists of examining the relationship between neighbo&d 
characteristics and application and denial rates.  Instead of gross denial rates, we use adjusted tract 
residuals computed using the coefficients in tables 4-6 (see equation [2]).  These can be thought of as tract 
14 The model was actually estimated using deviations about the means, which is computationally  equivalent to a 
single-component fixed-effects  model.  For 1990 (1991), the home purchase sample had 1,984,688 (2,087,470) 
observations located in 607,631 (662,571) unique combinations of  40,008 (39,963) tracts and 20,695 (26,508) 
lenders spread across 340 (341) MSAs; thus, the average tract had about 15 lenders in each year, each of whom 
served about 30 tracts per MSA.  For the refinancing sample in 1990 (1991), the 716,595 (1500,215) observations 
were located in 326,535 (563,380) unique combinations of 37,746 (38,912) tracts and 16,159 (23,284) lenders. 
For the home improvement loan sample in 1990 (1991), the 787,951 (861,518) observations were located in 
267,158 (285,605) unique combinations of  39,219 (39,216) tracts and 12,280 (13,276) lenders. 
l5 The reported standard errors in tables 4-6 are those from a standard regression program. These may be biased 
due to heteroskedasticity stemming from the linear probability model specification. 
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effects in these residuals; however, we also duplicate our analysis using deviations about MSA means. 
Means for the dependent and independent variables used in the second stage are given in table 7. Figures 
are reported for all tracts as well as separately for center city and suburban areas.  We do not give the 
- 
adjusted denial-rate means, since they are normalized (to zero) constructs. 
Regression results are presented in tables 8-1  1.  Independent variables are identical in each 
regression  However, the dependent variable and the sample are varied. Regressions were run separately 
for home purchase, refinance, and home improvement loans.  Table 8 presents results for the whole sample 
using the adjusted denial-rate residuals. In these, and in all regressions using the adjusted denial rates, 
tracts are weighted by the number of applications of each loan type in the tract  Table 9 gives results of 
regressions identical to those in table 8, except that all variables are expressed as deviations about MSA 
means (equivalent to adding a dummy variable for each MSA).  Tables 10 and 11 present results of 
regressions identical to those in tables 8 and 9, except that the dependent variable is the tract application 
rate, with observations weighted by the number of 1-4 unit residential properties in the tract 
Clearly, the format of the results presented in tables 8-1  1  makes it difficult to get a god  sense of 
the overall thrust of the data  To put this information into a more easily understood form, we decided to 
focus on only two neighborhood characteristics -- percent minority population in each tract and tract 
median family income. We also tried to distill the information in the regressions into a few summary 
variables. For each tract and loan type, the following were constructed: 1) gross denial rate, 2) denial rate 
adjusted for lender and individual characteristics (the dependent variable used for the regressions in tables 8 
and 9), and 3) gross application rate (the dependent variable in tables 10 and 11). 
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four variables. We subtracted these predicted values from the application and denial rates in each tract to 
compute adjusted residuals. These can be thought of as the application (or denial) rate in the tract adjusted 
for its demographic and economic characteristics (e.g., age of the housing stock and householders and 
house usage) and, in the case of the denial rate, the individual's characteristics as well.  Because of the 
particular concern with minority population share and tract family income, we constructed two separate 
adjusted residuals.  To examine the impact of minority population share, we computed residuals using the 
coefficients on all variables except those for minority population share and the change in minority share. 
These residuals are based on the predicted tract application (or denial) rate if the tract were all-white and 
had no change in racial composition from 1980 to 1990. The impact of tract income was examined using a 
similarly constructed residual that incorporates all variable coefficients  except those for median family 
income, the change in median income, median house value, and the change in house value.  Again, these 
residuals can be viewed as deviations from the predicted application (or denial) rate for a tract if it were 
assumed to have an average tract income, home value, and average changes from 1980 to 1990. 
Tracts were then sorted by minority share and median tract family income.  Tract values for each 
of  these variables were averaged (using applications or 1-4 unit residential properties as weights) for all 
tracts with the same income or minority share and were summarized in graph form.  In the subsections that 
follow, we discuss several issues using these results. 
Tract Racial Com~osition 
Loan denial rates arrayed by minority percentage in the tract are presented in figure 1. Panels are 
shown for each loan type using the same scale for comparison In each panel, three separate denial rates 
are shown: 1) the gross denial rate controlling for nothing (equivalent to the numbers presented in table 3), 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm2) the adjusted denial rate controlling for individual and lender characteristics (the dependent variable in the 
regressions presented in table 8), and 3) the fully adjusted denial rate adjusting for individual and lender 
characteristics, and for all tract characteristics except minority share (the residuals from the regressions 
presented in table 8). In each case, the denial rates are normalized to have a value of zero in tracts having a 
minority share of 2 percent or less. 
The gap in denial rates between white and minority neighborhoods is huge.  Moreover, although 
much of the difference disappears when individual and other tract characteristics are controlled for, a 
significant difference remains.  The difference between all-white and all-minority tracts for home purchase 
loan denial rates, for example, falls from .I67 when nothing is controlled for, to .084 when individual and 
lender characteristics are controlled for, to .044  when tract characteristics other than race are controlled 
for.  Similar reductions occur for refinance loans, where the gap narrows from .213 to .I18 to .OH. 
Neighborhood effects seem more persistent for home improvement loans, with a comparatively wide gap of 
.I56 remaining even after individual and nonracial neighborhood effects are taken into account 
The data in figure 1 reflect both between- and within-MSA effects, implying that it is the absolute 
characteristics of a tract that count. In figure 2, we present denial rate differences based only on within- 
MSA information (the gross denial rate data shown also have between-MSA differences removed). 
Controlling for MSA appears to virtually eliminate the effect of neighborhood racial composition on denial 
rates of home purchase and refinance loans, reducing the all-white and all-minority gap to .015 and .016, 
respectively, when all other factors are controlled for.  Thus, any relationship between the racial 
composition of the tract and denial rates appears to stem from variation across MSAs, not within them. 
Although reduced from figure 1, the fully adjusted denial rate gap between all-white and all-minority tracts 
for home improvement loan applications is stiU a significant .048. 
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individual characteristics, we plot the gross application rate and the rate adjusted for tract characteristics 
other than race.  Although it is necessary to bear in mind our concern about the adequacy of HMDA 
coverage, several conclusions emerge.  The gross difference in home purchase loan application rates 
between all-white and all-minority tracts presented in figure 3 (.042) is relatively large, especially when 
compared with the average tract application rate of .07 1 in the sample. However, this gap narrows to .007 
when characteristics other than race are controlled for. Indeed, nearly all differences in application rates 
across tracts of different racial composition disappear when adjusted rates are used  This is true whether 
between- and within-MSA data are used or just within-MSA numbers (figure 4). 
Tract Median Family Income 
Denial rates arrayed by tract median family income (measured in $1,800~)  are presented in figure 
5.  The variables plotted are similar to those used for figure 1 except that the fully adjusted rate represents 
the denial rate residual controlling for all tract characteristics except income, house value, and the change 
in both variables from 1980 to 1990. Each denial rate is normalized to have a value of zero for all 
neighborhoods with a median income of $1 10,800 or more. 
Unlike neighborhood racial composition, it appears that neighborhood income has a significant 
impact on home purchase and refinance denial rates even after other factors are controlled for. This is 
particularly true for loans in neighborhoods with median incomes below $20,000 (the median income for 
the average tract is $37,800). Ceteris paribus, home purchase loans in tracts with a median income of 
$20,000 are .073 more likely to be denied than loans in tracts with a $1  10,000 median, and .022 more 
likely than loans in tracts with a $40,800 median.  Differences for refinance loans are even more 
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neighbofhood income appears to have virtually no effect on home improvement loan denial rates. 
Although the magnitudes change somewhat, these findings also hold when only within-MSA 
differences are plotted (figure 6).  'Ihe only conclusion with a substantive change is the appearance that 
neighbofhood income may affect home improvement denial rates when MSA is controlled for, even though 
it has little effect when MSA is not considered. 
The income of a tract also appears to have a strong impact on home purchase and refinance (but 
not home improvement) application rates (figure 7).  This is true for both gross and adjusted rate 
comparisons, when MSA is not controlled for, and when only within-MSA differences are used (figure 8). 
The effect is monotonic, with the application rate steadily increasing in income up to the $65,000 to 
$70,000 level. 
Center Citv/Suburban 
Interim targets set up under HCDA require the GSEs to meet minimum gods for lending in center 
cities.  This suggests a belief by Congress that central city neighbofhoods are more likely to be underserved 
than are other neighborhoods.  HMDA data provide little evidence to support this view.  Controlling for 
other factors, denial rates for home purchase loans are slightly higher (.002)  in central city tracts than in 
other neighbofhoods (table 8).  However, ceteris paribus, denial rates are actually lower for refinance and 
home improvement loans (table 8).  We note, though, that when deviations about MSA means are used, the 
findings for refinance and home improvement loans reverse (table 9).  There also appears to be little 
evidence that, ceteris paribus, application rates differ significantly between center city and suburban tracts 
(table 10). Indeed, the regression results suggest that home purchase and home improvement loan 
application rates are actually higher in central city tracts. 
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suburban tracts separately (figures 9-12).  It is apparent from the plots that overall, the difference among 
tracts within central city or suburban areas is much larger than the gap between the two.  Moreover, it is 
not always the case that central city denial rates are larger. For example, among the poorest 
neighborhoods, suburban home purchase denial rates are actually higher than those for central cities.  The 
only exception to the general conclusion that central city does not matter is the relationship between home 
purchase and refinance application rates and neighborhood racial composition (figure 10). However, most 
of this difference disappears when the fully adjusted residuals are compared16 
Neighborhood versus Individual 
The  data presented in figures 1-12 reflect overall neighborhood effects.  Clearly, there may be 
interaction effects; that is, neighborhood effects may be different for different individuals. Moreover, 
neighborhood characteristics may be important -- not in and of themselves, but because certain types of 
people tend to live there.  The interaction between an individual's race and the racial composition of hisher 
neighborhood is examined in figures 13 and 14. In figure 13, the gross and adjusted (for individual 
characteristics other than race) differences between blackJwhite and Hispaniclwhite applicant denial rates 
are arrayed by neighborhood racial composition.  Unlike data presented in other figures, these are absolute 
differences and are not normalized.  Although a quite noisy series, the gap is generally widest in the 
predominantly white neighborhoods and lowest in the predominantly minority neighborhoods. 
This effect  is mirrored in figure 14, which gives the adjusted denial rate residuals (similar to the 
dependent variables in the table 8 regressions) calculated separately for each racial group.  These are each 
normalized to have a value of zero in tracts with a minority share of 2 percent or less. Interestingly, the 
16 Although not shown here, similar results emerge when within-MSA data are used. 
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black or Hispanic applicants. For example, ceteris paribus, a black applicant for a home purchase loan is 
.037 more likely to have hisher application denied in an all-minority tract than in an all-white tract; a white 
applicant, however, would be .I15 more likely. 
Similar data are presented for tracts arrayed by income in figures 15 and 16. Here, tract income 
appears to affect all racial groups in approximately the same way.  Except for home improvement loans -- 
and here only for middle-income tracts -- there is virtually no difference in tract effects by the individual's 
race. 
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
We have examined how a neighborhood's racial composition and median family income affect 
application and denial rates for home mortgage loans.  Several findings emerge.  We show that controlhg 
for nothing else, the racial composition of a tract appears to be strongly related to the likelihood that a loan 
application will be denied.  However, when other factors, particularly the individual's race and MSA, are 
controlled for, the difference largely disappears for home purchase and refinance loans (but not for home 
improvement loans). Similar findings emerge for application rates. 
It is important to note that this does not mean that '"ace  doesn't matter." Indeed, in our analysis 
of HMDA data, the most significant and persistent factor in explaining denial rates is the applicant's race 
(see Avery, Beeson, and Sniderman [1993a]). The current paper attempts to sort out the difference 
between the effects of an individual's race and the racial composition of the neighborhood. This, however, 
is an imperfect process, and strong interaction effects may exist.  Indeed, the data suggest that the racial 
composition of a neighborhood strongly affects the denial likelihood of white applicants. Moreover, even 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmif, ceteris paribus, the racial make-up of a neighborhood doesn't matter, neighborhood targeting by race 
may be a way of helping individual minorities and thus offsetting what appears  to be their adverse 
treatment in the denial process. 
We do find evidence that, ceteris paribus, a neighborhood's income does matter.  Although many 
effects are monotonic with no clear-cut breakpoints, tracts with median income below $20,000, in 
particular, show significantly higher denial rates, even when applicant characteristics (including income) 
and other tract characteristics are accounted for. Median tract income also appears to have a strong 
relationship with application rates, particularly for home purchase and refinance loans.  These effects 
remain even when other tract characteristics are controlled for. 
Evidence from HMDA data does not appear to support the congressional decision to single out 
central city tracts in setting targets for the GSEs under HCDA.  Although denial rates are marginally 
higher for home purchase loans in central cities, there is little evidence that central city and suburban tracts 
differ in either denial or application rates once individual tract characteristics are accounted for.  This does 
not mean that the selection of central city tracts for loan targets is necessarily wrong if, for example, most 
of these tracts are also low income and/or predominantly minority.  However, it would appear to be more 
effective to set targets according to tract-level characteristics than to use central city as a proxy. 
We caution that these results come from reduced-form regressions.  Differences in application or 
denial rates related to the racial composition or income of a neighborhood may stem from either unobserved 
variables related to risk or demand that we have failed to control for, coverage gaps in our data, inherent 
differences in mortgage demand, or differences in supply.  Only if we eliminated the first three "causes" 
could we conclude unequivocally that low-income neighboxhoods (or minority individuals) are underserved. 
On the other hand, the results make a prima facie case that neighboxhood income and individual race do 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmmatter.  Ceteris paribus, persons in low-income tracts are less likely to apply for loans and, if they do, are 
more likely to be denied  Similarly, loan applications by  minorities (particularly blacks) are significantly 
more likely to be denied than those by whites, even after other factors are controlled for.  These are not 
results that stem from one market or one loan product; rather, they are pervasive and appear to be 
widespread.  Thus, although our results are inconclusive, they are strongly suggestive of the need for 
further research. 
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mTable 1:  Characteristics of Mortgage Applications, National Sample, 1990 and 1991 HMDA 
Home Purchase  Refinance  Home Imvrovement 
Percent Percent Denial  Percent Percent Denial  Percent Percent Denial 
Sample Loan$  Rate  Sample Loan$  Rate  Sample Loan$  Rate 
Race ofApplicant 
Native American 





Race of Co-applicant 
No Co-applicant  28.7 
Same Race as Applicant  69.3 
Different Race than Applicant  2.0 
Income ofApplicant 
Less  than $25,000 
$25,000 to $50,000 
$50,000 to $75,000 
$75,000 to $100,000 
More than $100,000 
Loan Request 
Less  than  $50,000' 
$50,000 to $75,000' 
$75,000 to $125,000' 
More than  $125,000' 
Gender 
Male Applicant, Female Co-applicant  64.0 
Female Applicant, Male Co-applicant  4.3 
Male Applicant and Co-applicant  1.9 
Female Applicant and Co-applicant  1.3 
Single Male Applicant  16.9 
Single Female Applicant  11.8 







Loan  Denied  15.3 
Loan  Accepted and Withdrawn  2.7 
Loan  Originated  82.0 
Loan Kept by Originator (% of originations)  42.9 
Loan Sold to FNMA (% of originations)  15.2 
Loan Sold to GNMA (% of originations)  11.0 
Loan Sold to FHLMC (% of originations)  9.4 
Loan Sold Elsewhere (% of originations)  21.5 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 1:  (Continued) 
Home Purchase  Refinance  Home Im~rovement 
Percent Percent Denid  Percent Percent Denial  Percent Percent Denial 
Sample Loan$  Rate  Sample Loan$  Rate  Sample Loan$  Rate 
Reasons for Denial (of Loans ~enieq~ 








Mortgage Insurance Denied 
Other 
Memo Items: 
Median Income ($1,000~) 
Median Loan Request ($1,000~) 
Number of Loans 
Loan  categories for home improvement loans are 1) under $10,000,2) $10,000-$25,000, 3) $25,000-$50,000, and 4) over $50,000. 
Up to three reasons for denial could be given, and answers were voluntary. Each category gives the percentage of all  denials citing 
that reason as one of the three. 
Source for all  tables:  Authors. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 2:  Distribution of  1990 Census Population and 199011991 HMDA Loan Applications by Tract characteristics' 
1990 Census  HMDA Loan Ap~lications 
Total  Total  Minor  1-4  Home Purch  Refinance  Home Improve 
Tract  Pop  Pop  Units  Total  Minor  Total  Minor  Total  Minor 
Level & Change in Minority Population 
Less than 5 Percent Minority, 1990 
5 to 10 Percent Minority, 1990 
Rose < 5 Percent from 1980 
Rose > 5 Percent from 1980 
10 to 50 Percent Minority, 1990 
Rose < 5 Percent from 1980 
Rose 5 to 15 Percent from 1980 
Rose > 15 Percent from 1980 
50 Percent or More Minority, 1990 
Rose < 5 Percent from 1980 
Rose 5 to 15 Percent from 1980 
Rose > 15 Percent from 1980 
Share 
Black Population Share, 1990 
Less than 5 Percent  59.0  62.6  35.8  65.1  69.2  48.0  75.6  56.9  67.0  37.0 
5 to 10 Percent  10.6  11.9  11.2  11.3  12.5  14.0  10.3  12.9  10.4  9.4 
10 to 50 Percent  17.2  17.0  25.1  15.4  14.4  23.0  10.6  17.2  13.5  19.2 
50 Percent or More  12.2  8.5  27.9  8.2  4.0  15.0  3.4  13.1  9.1  34.3 
Hispanic Population Share, 1990 
Less than 5 Percent  65.0  62.4  39.8  66.9  65.5  39.0  58.2  25.4  68.6  51.4 
5 to 10 Percent  12.0  13.0  11.8  12.7  14.5  15.8  15.9  17.0  12.2  11.4 
10 to 50 Percent  18.0  19.0  30.9  16.5  17.2  33.8  22.0  41.3  16.0  25.7 
50 Percent or More  5.0  5.6  17.5  3.9  2.9  11.4  3.9  16.3  3.2  11.5 
Median Owner-occupied House Value, 1990 
Less than $50,000  21.6  15.6  25.5  17.2  9.6  12.5  5.7  4.9  17.5  32.2 
$50,000  to $100,000  39.2  42.7  33.2  43.1  44.2  34.4  31.0  17.4  43.4  30.2 
$100,000  or More  39.2  41.7  41.3  39.7  46.2  53.0  63.3  77.8  39.1  37.6 
Change in House Value, 1980-1990 
Rose Less than  25 Percent  12.6  12.4  10.1  12.7  12.3  9.5  6.8  2.9  12.5  11.0 
Rose 25 to 50 Percent  21.5  22.2  16.2  23.1  23.6  16.4  16.7  7.3  23.9  18.5 
Rose 50 to 100 Percent  28.4  30.2  31.7  30.7  32.0  30.6  28.0  20.9  31.2  34.5 
Rose 100 to 150 Percent  14.1  14.4  16.4  13.9  15.8  20.5  22.7  30.9  16.8  17.8 
Rose More than 150 Percent  23.3  20.8  25.5  19.5  16.2  23.1  25.8  38.0  15.6  18.2 
Median Family Income, 1990 
Less than  $20,000  11.5  7.6  21.2  6.6  2.6  7.1  1.9  5.3  5.3  16.5 
$20,000  to $30,000  21.6  19.6  29.4  18.7  13.3  19.4  10.1  16.7  16.7  25.3 
$30,000  to $40,000  28.3  29.7  24.7  29.8  29.1  28.1  24.8  24.8  30.8  25.4 
$40,000  or More  38.7  43.1  24.7  44.8  55.0  45.3  63.1  53.1  47.2  32.8 
Center City, MMSA  Size, 1990 
Center City 
MSA Less than 1  Million  24.2  21.5  22.2  22.5  20.6  18.3  14.8  10.6  19.6  20.5 
MSA 1  to 2 Million  7.5  6.6  9.5  6.7  6.2  8.0  4.8  5.9  6.9  10.5 
MSA More than  2 Million  20.2  17.4  32.8  15.0  13.1  24.4  15.7  28.7  15.4  30.8 
Non-Center City 
MSA Less than 1  Million  19.4  21.3  10.2  22.6  22.4  10.9  20.7  8.1  22.3  9.3 
MSA 1  to 2 Million  7.7  8.8  4.6  9.1  10.0  6.6  8.7  4.9  9.0  4.4 
MSA More than 2 Million  21.1  24.3  20.8  24.0  27.7  31.7  35.3  41.8  26.8  24.5 
Percentages sum to 100 for each group for each column. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 3:  Percentage of Applications Denied by Census Tract Characteristics, 199011991 HMDA' 
Home Purchase  Refinance  Home Improvement 
White  Black  Hispanic White  Black  Hispanic  White  Black  Hispanic 
Level & Change in Minority Population Share 
Less than 5 Percent Minority, 1990 
5 to 10 Percent Minority, 1990 
Rose < 5 Percent from 1980 
Rose > 5 Percent from 1980 
10 to 50 Percent Minority, 1990 
Rose < 5 Percent from 1980 
Rose 5 to 15 Percent from 1980 
Rose > 15 Percent from 1980 
50 Percent or More Minority, 1990 
Rose < 5 Percent from 1980 
Rose 5 to 15 Percent from 1980 
Rose > 15 Percent from 1980 
Black Population Share, 1990 
Less than 5 Percent 
5 to 10 Percent 
10 to 50 Percent 
50 Percent or More 
Hispanic Population Share, 1990 
Less than 5 Percent 
5 to 10 Percent 
10 to 50 Percent 
50 Percent or More 
Median Owner-occupied House Value, 1990 
Less than  $50,000 
$50,000 to $100,000 
$100,000 or More 
Change in House  Value, 1980-1990 
Rose Less than 25 Percent 
Rose 25 to 50 Percent 
Rose 50 to 100 Percent 
Rose 100 to 150 Percent 
Rose More than 150 Percent 
Median Family Income, 1990 
Less than  $20,000 
$20,000 to $30,000 
$30,000 to $40,000 
$40,000 or More 
Center City, MM  Size, 1990 
Center City 
MSA Less than 1 Million 
MSA 1 to 2 Million 
MSA More than 2 Million 
Non-Center City 
MSA Less than 1 Million 
MSA 1 to 2 Million 
MSA More than 2 Million 
Application denial percentage for each category. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 4: Linear Probability Model of Loan Denial (1) or Acceptance (0), Home Purchase 
1990 
Coefficient  Standard Error 
1991 
Coefficient  Standard Error 
Owner-occupied (Dummy)  .00649*** 
Race (Dummies, "White"  Is Base Group) 
Native American Applicant  .02636*** 
Asian Applicant  .00171 
Black Applicant  .10385*'* 
Hispanic Applicant  .03841m* 
Other Race Applicant  .03043"' 
Mixed Race, Minority Co-applicant (Dummy)  .00764'* 
Mixed Race, Non-minority Co-applicant (Dummy)  -.02324"' 
Income, Interacted with Race 





Other Race Applicant 
Income Splines (31,000's) 
Income Spline at $20.000 
Income Spline at $40,000 
Income Spline at $60,000 
Income Spline at $80,000 
Income Spline at $100,000 
Income Spline at $150,000 
Income Spline at $200,000 
Loan Amount (31,000's) 
Loan  Amount 
Loan  Amount Spline at $20,000 
Loan  Amount Spline at $40,000 
Loan  Amount Spline at $60,000 
Loan Amount Spline at $80,000 
Loan  Amount Spline at $100,000 
Loan  Amount Spline at $150,000 
Loan  Amount Spline at $200,000 
Loan-to-Income Ratio (Dummies, Less than 1.5 Is Base Group) 
Ratio of 1.5 to 2.0  -.01012*'* 
Ratio of 2.0 to 2.25  -.01158"* 
Ratio of 2.25  to 2.5  -.01176"* 
Ratio of 2.5 to 2.75  -.00713**' 
Ratio of 2.75  to 3.0  .00362 
Ratio over 3.0  .05105*** 
Applicant Gender (Dummies, Female Applicant, No Co-applicant Is Base Group) 
Male Applicant, Female Co-applicant  -.01875* 
Female Applicant, Male Co-applicant  -.00726 
Male Applicant and Co-applicant  -.00354 
Female Applicant and Co-applicant  -.00984 
Male Applicant, No Co-applicant  .02815*** 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 4: (Continued) 
Income, Interacted with No  Co-applicant 
Income 
Income Spline at $20,000 
Income Spline at $40,000 
Income Spline at $60,000 
Income Spline at $80,000 
Income Spline at $100,000 
Race and Marital Status, Interacted with VA Loan 





Other Race Applicant 
No  Co-applicant 
Race and Marital Status, Interacted with FHA  Loan 





Other Race Applicant 
No Co-applicant 
Income, Interacted with VA or FHA  Loan 
Income 
Income Spline at $20,000 
Income Spline at $40,000 
Income Spline at $60,000 
Income Spline at $80,000 
Income Spline at $100,000 
Loan Amount, Interacted with VA or FHA  Loan 
Loan Amount 
Loan Amount Spline at $20,000 
Loan Amount Spline at $40,000 
Loan Amount Spline at $60,000 
Loan Amount Spline at $80,000 
Loan Amount Spline at $100,000 
Loan-to-Income Ratio, Interacted with VA or FHA  Loan 
Ratio of 1.5 to 2.0 
Ratio of 2.0 to 2.25 
Ratio of 2.25  to 2.5 
Ratio of  2.5 to 2.75 
Ratio of 2.75  to 3.0 
Ratio over 3.0 
1990 
Coefficient  Standard Error 
1991 
Coefficient  Standard Error 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 4:  (Continued) 
1990  1991 
Coefficient  Standard Error  Coefficient  Standard Error 













Number of Observations 
Mean Denial Rate in Regression Sample 
Number of Tracthstitution Dummies 
R Squared (Including Tradhstitution Dummies) 
R  Squared (Variation around Tmcilhtitution Means) 
.. Significant at the 5 percent level. 
*..  Significant at the 1  percent level. 
Significant at the .1 percent level. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 5:  Linear Probability Model of Loan Denial (1) or Acceptance (0), Refinance 
1990 
Coefficient  Standard Error 
1991 
Coefficient  Standard Error 
Owner-occupied (Dummy) 
VA Loan (Dummy) 
Race (Dummies, "White"  Is Base Group) 
Native American Applicant  .02245 
Asian Applicant  .04053*" 
Black Applicant  .06370°** 
Hispanic Applicant  .04342*'* 
Other Race Applicant  .03812'** 
Mixed Race, Minority Co-applicant (Dummy)  .00340 
Mixed Race,  Non-minority Co-applicant (Dummy)  -.02737*** 
Income, Interacted with Race 





Other Race Applicant 
Income Splines (31,000's) 
Income Spline at $20,000 
Income Spline at $40,000 
Income Spline at $60,000 
Income Spline at $80,000 
Income Spline at $100,000 
Income Spline at $150,000 
Income Spline at $200,000 
Loan Amount (31,000's) 
Loan Amount 
Loan Amount Spline at $20,000 
Loan Amount Spline at $40,000 
Loan Amount Spline at $60,000 
Loan Amount Spline at $80,000 
Loan Amaunt Spline at $100,000 
Loan Amount Spline at $150,000 
Loan Amount Spline at $200,000 
Loan-to-Income Ratio (Dummies, Less than 1.5 Is Base Group) 
Ratio of 1.5 to 2.0  -.00241 
Ratio of 2.0 to 2.25  .00433 
Ratio of 2.25 to 2.5  .00667* 
Ratio of 2.5  to 2.75  .01452"* 
Ratio of 2.75 to 3.0  .02524*** 
Ratio over 3  .O  .085 19." 
Applicant Gender (Dummies, Female Applicant, No Co-applicant Is Base Group) 
Male Applicant, Female Co-applicant  -.09152*** 
Female Applicant, Male Co-applicant  -.08392*** 
Male Applicant and Co-applicant  -.06548*'* 
Female Applicant and Co-applicant  -.08076*** 
Male Applicant, No  Co-applicant  .02499*** 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 5:  (Continued) 
Income, Interacted with No Co-applicant 
Income 
Income Spline at $20,000 
Income Spline at $40,000 
Income Spline at $60,000 
Income Spline at $80,000 
Income Spline at $100,000 
Interactions with VA or FHA Loan 






















Number of Observations 
Mean Denial Rate in Regression Sample 
Number of TractAnstitution Dummies 
R Squared (Including Tract5stitution Dummies) 
R Squared (Variation around Tracthmtitution Means) 
1990  1991 
Coefficient  Standard Error  Coefficient  Standard Error 
.. Significant at the 5 percent level. 
... Signilicant at the 1  percent level. 
Significant at the .1  percent level. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 6:  Linear Probability Model of Loan Denial (1) or Acceptance (0), Home Improvement 
1990  1991 
Coefficient  Standard Error  Coefficient  Standard Error 
Owner-occupied (Dummy) 
VA I-4x3n  (Dummy) 
Race (Dummies, "White"  Is Base Group) 




Other Race Applicant 
Mixed Race, Minority Co-applicant (Dummy) 
Mixed Race, Non-minority Co-applicant (Dummy) 
Income, Interacted with Race 





Other Race Applicant 
Income Splines (31,000's) 
Income Spline at $20,000 
Income Spline at $40,000 
Income Spline at $60,000 
Income Spline at $80,000 
Income Spline at $100,000 
Income Spline at $150,000 
Income Spline at $200,000 
Loan Amount (Dummies or %l,OOO1s) 
$1,000 or $2,000 Loan (Dummy) 
$3,000 or $4,000 Loan @Immy) 
$5,000 or $6,000 Loan (Dummy) 
$7,000 or $8,000 Loan (Dummy) 
$9,000 or $10,000 Loan (Dummy) 
Loan Amount Spline at $10,000 
Loan Amount Spline at $25,000 
Loan Amount Spline at $50,000 
Loan Amount Spline at $100,000 
Loan Amount Spline at $150,000 
Loan Amount Spline at $200,000 
Loan-to-Income Ratio (Dummies, Less than 1.51s Base Group) 
Ratio of  1.5 to 2.0 
Ratio of 2.0 to 2.25 
Ratio of 2.25 to 2.5 
Ratio of 2.5 to 2.75 
Ratio of 2.75 to 3.0 
Ratio over 3.0 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 6:  (Continued) 
1990  1991 
Coefficient  Standard Error  Coefficient  Standard Error 
Applicant Gender (Dummies, Female Applicant, No  Co-applicant Is Base Gro,ug) 
Male Applicant, Female Co-applicant  -.  11  149 
Female Applicant, Male Co-applicant  -.07509"' 
Male Applicant and Co-applicant  -.04764'*' 
Female Applicant and Co-applicant  -.0803 1.'. 
Male Applicant, No Co-applicant  .03643-' 
Income, Interacted with No Co-applicant 
Income 
Income Spline at $20,000 
Income Spline at $40,000 
Income Spline at $60,000 
Income Spline at $80,000 
Income Spline at $100,000 
Interactions with VA or FHA Loan 






















Number of Observations  787,952 
Mean Denial Rate in Regression Sample  .238 
Number of Tracthstitution Dummies  267,159 
R Squared (Including Tmdhstitution  Dummies)  .474 
R Squared (Variation around Tracthstitution Means)  .029 
.. Signiticant at the 5 percent level. 
... Significant at the 1 percent level. 
Signiticant at the .1  percent level. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 7:  Variable Means, All Tracts, Center City, and Suburban ~racts' 
All Tracts  Center City Tracts  Suburban Tracts 
Loan Application Rate (199011991 HMDA Applications Divided by Total 1-4 Unit Structures) 
Home Purchase Loans  .07 143  .WO 
Refinance Loans  .03930  .03 145 
Home Impmvement Loans  .02871  .02721 
Minority Population Share, I990  .20884  .28837 
Change in Minority Share, 1980-1990 (Dummies) 
Change in Share Less than 0  .I2162 
Change in Share between  0 and .05  .54155 
Change in Share between .05 and .10  .I6055 
Change in Share between .10 and .15  .08302 
Change in Share More than .l5  .09326 
Median Family Income, 1990 ($100,000'~)  44354  .40118 
Change in Median Family Income, 1980-1990 (Dummies) 
Change in Income Less than  25%  .01803 
Change in Income between 25% and 50%  .08958 
Change in Income between 50% and 100%  .62223 
Change in Income More than 100%  .27004 
Age of Household Head, 1990 
Share of Household Heads under 25 
Share of Household Heads 25-34 
Share of Household Heads 35-44 
Share of Household Heads 45-54 
Share of Household Heads 55-64 
Share of Household Heads 65-74 
Share of Household Heads 75 or Older 
Median Owner-occupied House Value,  1990 ($100,000'~)  1.33740  1.22233 
Change in Median House Value, 1980-1990 (Dummies) 
Change in Value Less than 25%  .lo819 
Change in Value between  25% and 50%  .21743 
Change in Value between 50% and 100%  .30740 
Change in Value between 100%  and 150%  .I7918 
Change in Value More than 150%  .I8780 
Structure Variables, 1990 
Share of Structures Single Unit Detached 
Share of Structures Single Unit Attached 
Share of Structures 2 Units 
Share of Structures 3-4 Units 
Share of Structures 5 or More Units 
Share of Structures Mobile Homes 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 7:  (Continued) 
All Tracts  Center City Tracts  Suburban Tracts 
Usage of  1-4 Unit Structures, 1990 
Share of Housing Units Owner Occupied 
Share of  Housing Units Rented 
Share of  Housing Units Vacant 
Change in House Usage, 1980-1990 
Growth Rate of Total Housing Units 
Growth Rate of  1-4 Unit Structures 
Change in Share of  1-4 Units Rented 
Change in Share of  1-4 Units Vacant 
Age of Housing Stock, 1980 
Share of Housing Stock Built 1979-1980 
Share of Housing Stock Built 1975-1978 
Share of Housing Stock Built 1970-1974 
Share of Housing Stock Built 1960-1969 
Share of Housing Stock Built 1950-1959 
Share of Housing Stock Built 1940-1949 
Share of Housing Stock Built Prior to  1940 
Number of Tracts 
Tracts weighted by the total number of loan applications of  all types in 1990 and 1991. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 8: All Tracts, 199011991 HMDA, Denial Rates 
Home Purchase  Refinance 
Parameter Standard  Parameter Standard 
Estimate  Error  Estimate  Error 
Intercept 
Center City (Dummy) 
Minority Population Share, 1990 
Minority Share  .07100*  .03418  .43291°"  .04509 
Minority Share Spline at .05  .18832'"  .05120  -.18898"  .06832 
Minority Share Spline  at .10  -24255'"  .02841  -.17373*" .03824 
Minority Share Spline at .25  -.01885  .01359  49782'"  .01771 
Minority Share Spline at .50  .05376*"  .01038  .06608"  .01303 
Change in Minority Share, 1980-1990 (Dummies,  Less than 0 Is Base Group) 
Change in Share between .O and .05  ,00363'"  .00089  .01698*" .00120 
Change in Share between .05 and .lo  .01049-  .00113  .02413'-  .0015  1 
Change in Share between .10  and .15  .01367'"  .00140  .03277'"  .00184 
Change in Share More than .15  .02115*"  .00149  .04528*"  .00196 
Median Family Income. 1990 
Median Family Income ($100,000'~)  -.20070b" .02470  -.4705  1'"  .03644 
Median Family Income Spline  at  $25,000  .01757  .02648  .17271b" .03919 
Median Family Income Spline at $40,000  .00328  .01305  .05235"  .01737 
Median Family Income Spline at $55,000  .08475*" .01W  .15230'"  .01183 
Change in Median Family Income, 1980-1990 (Dummies,  Less than 25% Is Base Group) 
Change in Income between 25% and 50%  .00647"  .00237  .01850'"  .004  10 
Change in Income between 50% and 100%  .00601'  .00239  .02021'"  .00407 
Change in Income More than 100%  .01065'"  .00256  .03746*" .00422 
Age of Household Head, 1990 
Share of Household Heads 25-34  .06214"  .01402  .28383*"  .01994 
Share of Household Heads 35-44  .03678"  .01287  .08186'"  .01778 
Share of Household Heads 45-54  .14615*"  .01788  .3  1  139'"  .02350 
Share of Household Heads 55-64  .19472'"  .01906  .33159'"  ,02519 
Share of Household Heads 65-74  -.00325  .01724  .16530'"  .02382 
Share of Household Heads 75 or Older  .09518*"  .01360  .22982*" .01944 
Median Owner-occupied House Value,  1990 
Median House Value ($100,000'~)  -.02922"  .01026  .06909*" .01701 
Median House Value Spline at $50,000  .04170b" .01115  -.03  141  .01842 
Median House Value Spline at $100,000  .01039'  .00428  -.02573'"  .00586 
Median House Value Spline at $150,000  -.01573*" .00264  -.01903*" .00331 
Change in Median House Value,  1980-1990 (Dummies,  Less than 25% Is Base Group) 
Change in Value between 25% and 50%  .00303"  .00098  .00620'"  .00163 
Change in Value between 50% and 100%  .00836'"  .00105  .01112'"  .00169 
Change in Value between 100% and 150%  .01515'"  .00140  .01622*" .00203 
Change in Value More than 150%  .02265*" .00162  .02080'"  .00222 
Home Irn~rovement 
Parameter Standard 
Estimate  Error 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 8:  (Continued) 
House Usage Variables, 1990 
Share of Structures Single Unit Attached 
Share of Structures 2 Units 
Share of Structures 34  Units 
Share of Structures 5 or More Units 
Share of Structures Mobile Homes 
Share of  14  Unit Structures Rented 
Share of 14  Unit Structures Vacant 
Change in House Usage, 1980-1990 
Growth Rate of Total Housing Units 
Growth Rate of 14  Unit Structures 
Change in Share 14  Units Rented 
Change in Share 14  Units Vacant 
Age of Housing Stock, 1980 
Share of Housing Stock Built 1979-1980 
Share of Housing Stock Built 1975-1978 
Share of Housing Stock Built 1970-1974 
Share of Housing Stock Built 1960-1969 
Share of Housing Stock Built 1950-1959 
Share of Housing Stock Built 1940-1949 
Memo Items: 
R Squared (Weighted by Loan  Applications) 
Dependent Variable Mean 
Number of Tracts 
Home Purchase 
Parameter Standard 
Estimate  Error 
Refinance  Home Irn~rovement 
Parameter  Standard  Parameter Standard 
Estimate  Error  Estimate  Error 
u  Significant at the 5 percent level. 
*"  Significant at the 1  percent level. 
Significant at the .I percent level. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 9:  All Tracts, 1990/199 1 HMDA, Denial Rates, Deviations about MSA Means 
Home Purchase  Refmance 
Parameter Standard  Parameter Standard 
Estimate  Error  Estimate  Error 
Home Imurovement 
Parameter Standard 
Estimate  Error 
Center City (Dummy)  .00006  .00062  .00393*" 
Minoriry Population Share, 1990 
Minority Share 
Minority Share Spline at -05 
Minority Share Spline at .10 
Minority Share Spline  at .25 
Minority Share Spline at .50 
Change in Minority Share, 1980-1990 (Dummies,  Less than 0 Is Base Group) 
Change in Share between .O  and .05  -.00064  .00081  .00187 
Change in Share between .05 and .10  .00226*  .00102  .00246 
Change in Share between -10 and .15  .00160  .00126  .00302 
Change in Share More than -15  .00347*  .00138  .00501" 
Median Family Income, 1990 
Median Family Income ($100,000'~)  -.14083*"  .02207  -.13641b" 
Median Family Income Spline at  $25,000  .05912*  .02330  .10859" 
Median Family Income Spline  at $40,000  .02711b  .01170  -.02005 
Median Family Income Spline at $55,000  .02424"  .00913  .01484 
Change in Median Family Income, 1980-1990 (Dummies,  Less than 25% Is Base Group) 
Change in Income between 25% and 50%  .00659"  .00210  .00233 
Change in Income between 50% and 100%  .00453*  .00216  -.00324 
Change in Income More than 100%  .00327  .00233  -.00172 
Age of Household Head, 1990 
Share of Household Heads 25-34  .01780  .013 18  .04764" 
Share of Household Heads 35-44  .01515  .01179  .02805 
Share of Household Heads 45-54  .08894*"  .01652  .10133*" 
Share of Household Heads 55-64  .08581b"  .01741  .08441b" 
Share of Household Heads 65-74  -.05728*"  .01588  -.05359* 
Share of Household Heads 75 or Older  -.01050  .01246  .02377 
Median Owner-occupied  House Value, 1990 
Median House Value ($100,000'~)  -.08682*"  .00947  -.  12467'" 
Median House Value Spline at $50,000  .05970b"  .01003  .04366" 
Median House Value Spline at $100,000  .01896*"  .00399  .03090b" 
Median House Value Spline at $150,000  .00025  .00255  .03035*" 
Change in Median House Value,  1980-1990 (Dummies,  Less than 25% Is Base Group) 
Change in Value between 25% and 50%  .00447*"  .00106  .00092 
Change in Value between 50% and 100%  .00825*"  .00 128  -.00040 
Change in Value between 100% and 150%  .0073o0"  .00162  -.00549* 
Change in Value More than 150%  .00203  .00190  -.01459*" 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 9:  (Continued) 
Home Purchase 
Parameter  Standard 
Estimate  Error 
Refiiance 
Parameter  Standard 
Estimate  Error 
Home Improvement 
Parameter  Standard 
Estimate  Error 
House Usage Variables,  1990 
Share of Structures Single Unit Attached  -.05225*"  .00307 
Share of Structures 2 Units  -.02634*"  .00595 
Share of Structures 3-4 Units  -.029  13'"  .00696 
Share of Structures 5 or More Units  -.00204  .00260 
Share of Structures Mobile Homes  .02777*"  .00358 
Share of  1-4 Unit Structures Rented  .05 867'"  .00453 
Share of 1-4 Unit Structures Vacant  .07225*"  .00582 
Change in House  Usage,  1980-1990 
Growth Rate of Total Housing Units  .00185  .00123 
Growth Rate of  1-4 Unit Structures  -.00263'  .00126 
Change in Share 1-4 Units Rented  -.01693"  .00516 
Change in Share 1-4 Units Vacant  -.01846"  .00711 
Age of Housing Stock, 1980 
Share of Housing Stock Built 1979-1980  -.02764*"  .00506 
Share of Housing Stock Built 1975-1978  -.01397'"  .00337 
Share of Housing Stock Built 1970-1974  -.01409'"  .00311 
Share of Housing Stock Built 1960-1969  -.01772'"  .00266 
Share of Housing Stock Built 1950-1959  -.01377*"  .00277 
Share of Housing Stock Built 1940-1949  -.02070b"  .00443 
Memo Items: 
R Squared Total (Weighted by Loan Applications)  .464 
R Squared about MSA Means  .206 
Dependent Variable Mean  .00OOO 
Number of Tracts  38,609 
Significant  at the 5 percent level. 
** 
'U Significant at the 1  percent level. 
Significant  at the .1 percent level. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 10:  All Tracts, 199011991 HMDA, Application Rates 
Home Purchase  Refinance 
Parameter Standard  Parameter Standard 
Estimate  Error  Estimate  Error 
Home Im~rovement 
Parameter  Standard 
Estimate  Error 
Intercept 
Center City (Dummy) 
Minority Population Share, 1990 
Minority Share  -.00352  .02313  -.28203*" 
Minority Share Spline at .05  -.01778  .03553  .27596*" 
Minority Share Spline at  .10  .00822  .02043  .02191 
Minority Share Spline at  .25  .01734  .00939  -.01337* 
Minority Share Spline at  .50  -.01645*  .00654  .00955* 
Change in Minority Share, 1980-1990 (Dummies.  Less than 0 Is Base Group) 
Change in Share between .O  and .05  .00089  .00060  .00237*" 
Change in Share between .05 and .10  -.00029  .00077  .00214*" 
Change in Share between .10 and .15  .00110  .00094  .00212*" 
Change in Share More than .15  .00295"  .00098  .00285*" 
Median Family Income, 1990 
Median Family Income ($100,000'~)  .04136*"  .01249  -.04371*" 
Median Family Income Spline at $25,000  -.00826  .01342  -.00010 
Median Family Income Spline at $40,000  .01790*  .00889  -.05250°" 
Median Family Income Spline at $55,000  -.05958*"  .00742  .00157 
Change in Median Family Incorn, 1980-1990 (Dummies,  Less than 25% Is Base Group) 
Change in Income between 25% and 50%  .00277*  .00120  .00073 
Change in Income between 50% and 100%  .00655*"  .00124  .00477*" 
Change in Income More than 100%  .00527*"  .00140  .00161 
Age of Household Head. 1990 
Share of Household Heads 25-34  .11266*"  .00923  -.03383*" 
Share of Household Heads 35-44  .07361"  .00863  -.01274* 
Share of Household Heads 45-54  .05945*"  .01177  .02128" 
Share of Household Heads 55-64  -.00100  .01228  -.12428'" 
Share of Household Heads 65-74  .005!n  .01124  -.05485*" 
Share of Household Heads 75 or Older  .08399*"  .00900  -.01269* 
Median Owner-occupied House Value, 1990 
Median House Value ($100,000'~)  .01617"  .00508  .01748*" 
Median House Value Spline at $50,000  .01488"  .00571  .03508'" 
Median House Value Spline at $100,000  -.01822"  .00298  .01375" 
Median House Value Spline at $150,000  -.00345  .00195  -.03202*" 
Change in Median House Value, 1980-1990 (Dummies,  Less than 25%  Is Base Group) 
Change in Value between 25% and 50%  -.00115  .00067  .00242*" 
Change in Value between 50% and 100%  -.00195"  .00072  .00354'" 
Change in Value between 100 and 150%  -.00887*"  .00096  .00593*" 
Change in Value More than 150%  -.02742*"  .00110  -.01706"* 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 10: (Continued) 
House Usage Variables, 1990 
Share of Structures Single Unit Attached 
Share of Structures 2 Units 
Share of  Structures 3-4  units 
Share of Structures 5  or More Units 
Share of Structures  Mobile Homes 
Share of  1-4  Unit Structures Rented 
Share of  1-4  Unit Structures Vacant 
Change in House Usage, 1980-1990 
Growth Rate of Total Housing Units 
Growth Rate of  1-4 Unit Structures 
Change in Share 1-4  Units Rented 
Change in Share 1-4  Units Vacant 
Age of Housing Stock, 1980 
Share of Housing Stock Built 1979-1980 
Share of Housing Stock Built 1975-1978 
Share of Housing Stock Built 1970-1974 
Share of Housing Stock Built 1960-  1969 
Share of Housing Stock Built 1950-1959 
Share of Housing Stock Built 1940-1949 
Memo Items: 
R Squared (Weighted by  1-4  Units) 
Dependent Variable Mean 
Number of Tracts 
Home Purchase 
Parameter  Standard 
Estimate  Error 
Refinance 
Parameter Standard 
Estimate  Error 
Home Im~rovernent 
Parameter Standard 
Estimate  Error 
** Significant at the 5  percent level. 
*"  Signif~cant  at the 1  percent level. 
Significant at the .I percent level. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 11: All Tracts, 1990/1991  HMDA, Application Rates, Deviations about MSA Means 
Home Purchase  Refinance  Home Im~rovement 
Parameter Standard  Parameter  Standard  Parameter Standard 
Estimate  Error  Estimate  Error  Estimate  Error 
Center City (Dummy)  .00251e" .00046  -.00075'"  .00023 
Minority Population Share, 1990 
Minority Share 
Minority Share Spline at .05 
Minority Share Spline at  .10 
Minority Share Spline at  .25 
Minority Share Spline at  .SO 
Change in Minority Share, 1980-1990 (Dummies,  Less than 0 Is Base Group) 
Change in Share between .O and .05  .00104  .00059  -.00063*  .00029 
Change in Share between .05 and .10  .OOO37  .00075  -.00038  .00036 
Change in Share between .10  and .15  .00178  .00092  -.00069  .00045 
Change in Share More than .15  .00339*" .00097  -.00071  .00047 
Median Family Income, 1990 
Median Family Income ($100,000'~)  .05511e" .01227  -.02502*" .00606 
Median Family Income Spline at  $25,000  .00512  .01282  .03775*" .00634 
Median Family Income Spline at  $40,000  .03670e" .00861  .01680e" .00418 
Median Family Income Spline at $55,000  -.06490°"  .00724  -.027  19'"  .00351 
Change in Median Family Income, 1980-1990 (Dummies,  Less than 25% Is Base Group) 
Change in Income between 25% and 50%  -00068  .00116  -.00032  .MI057 
Change in Income between 50% and 100%  .00065  .00123  -.00018  .OM1 
Change in Income More than 100%  .00191  .00140  .00046  .00069 
Age of Household Head, I990 
Share of Household Heads 25-34  .14284*"  .00924  -.01318"  .00450 
Share of  Household Heads 35-44  .08264*" .00847  .01436*" .00413 
Share of Household Heads 45-54  .06724*" .O  1  16 1  .05643*" .00565 
Share of Household Heads 55-64  .03307"  .01203  -.02508*" .00586 
Share of Household Heads 65-74  .01739  .01107  -.02420e" .00539 
Share of Household Heads 75 or Older  .08753*" .00884  -.00363  .00430 
Median Owner-occupied  House Value. 1990 
Median House Value ($100,000'~)  .00407  -00525  .01217*" .00259 
Median House Value Spline at $50,000  .01616"  .00565  -.OW  .00278 
Median House Value Spline at $100,000  -.02455*" .00302  .00835*" .00146 
Median House Value Spline at $150,000  -00342  .00203  -.01094*" .00098 
Change in Median House Value.  1980-1990 (Dummies,  Less than 25% Is Base Group) 
Change in Value between 25% and 50%  -.00012  .00077  .00416*" .00038 
Change in Value between 50% and 100%  .00339*" .OOO95  .00943*" .00046 
Change in Value between 100% and 150%  .00398"  .00122  .01411*" .00059 
Change in Value More than 150%  -.00062  .00145  .00970e" .00071 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmTable 11: (Continued) 
House Usage Variables, 1990 
Share of Structures Single Unit Attached 
Share of Structures 2 Units 
Share of Structures 34  Units 
Share of Structures 5  or More Units 
Share of Struchlres Mobile Homes 
Share of 14 Unit Structures Rented 
Share of 14 Unit Structures Vacant 
Change in House Usage, 1980-1990 
Growth Rate of Total Housing Units 
Growth Rate of 14 Unit Structures 
Change in Share 14 Units Rented 
Change in Share 14 Units Vacant 
Age of Housing Stock, 1980 
Share of Housing Stock Built 1979-1980 
Share of Housing Stock Built 1975-1978 
Share of Housing Stock Built 1970-1V4 
Share of Housing Stock Built 1960-1969 
Share of Housing Stock Built 1950-1959 
Share of Housing Stock Built 1940-1949 
Memo  Items: 
R Squared Total (Weighted by 14 Units) 
R Squared about MSA Means 
Dependent Variable Mean 
Number of Tracts 
Home Purchase  Refinance  Home Improvement 
Parameter  Standard  Parameter Standard  Parameter  Standard 
Estimate  Error  Estimate  Error  Estimate  Error 
11 Significant at the 5  percent level. 
1"  Significant at the 1  percent level. 
Significant at the .1 percent level. 
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